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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an Order denying Defendant's Motion to 
Correct Sentence rendered against Appellant, in the Third Judicial 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Title 78, Section 2a-3, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it sentenced 
Louis Clark to consecutive sentences because Clark raised his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and refused to 
cooperate with law enforcement authorities? 
STANDARD QF APPELATE REVIEW 
Whether a trial court has exceeded its scope of discretion is 
reviewed for correctness by the Court of Appeals, State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). "'Correctness' means 
the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not 
defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. AND RULES 
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." U.S. CONST, amend. V. 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
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shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Const.. Art. I, § 12. 
"A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences." Utah Code Ann.. § 76-3-401 (2) (1990). 
"The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." U.R.Cr.P. 22(e). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This is an appeal from Appellant's Motion to Correct Sentence 
which was filed on October 12, 1994. An Order denying the Motion 
to Correct Sentence was signed by Judge Rigtrup on December 16, 
1994, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
Appellant, Louis Malcolm Clark ("Clark")/ was originally 
charged with three counts of falsely signing a financial 
transaction card/sales slip, all second degree felonies. After a 
two-day jury trial, held on November 17 and 18, 1992, one count 
was dismissed upon the State's motion, but Clark was convicted on 
the remaining two counts. A sentencing hearing was set for 
January 4, 1993. At the sentencing hearing, the Trial Court 
stated that Clark had failed to disclose information related to 
his background and family, and failed to cooperate with the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department ("Parole Department") concerning 
his presentence report. Post-Trial Motions. Transcript of 
Proceedings ("Hra. 1"), at 245. The State recommended that Clark 
go to prison and serve consecutive sentences because the State did 
not know if any prior crimes had been committed. Hra. 1 at 243. 
The Trial Court stated that Clark failed to disclose the 
details of the crime he was convicted of, or "other reported 
incidents which are very similar in the Intermountain West." 
(Emphasis added) l£. at 248. The Court then told Clark that he 
would pay a heavy penalty if he did not disclose how the credit 
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cards were picked up, and any co-conspirators involved in the 
crime. !£. at 250. The Trial Court directed Clark to provide a 
description of the crime and some collateral contacts to the 
Parole Department. X£. at 253, 254. Thereafter, a second hearing 
was set for February 22, 1993. 
No one from the Parole Department interviewed, or even 
contacted Clark because he had already been transferred to the 
Utah State Prison. At the second sentencing hearing, a Salt Lake 
County Assistant District Attorney stated that for law enforcement 
purposes, the State desired the detective involved in Clark's 
case, and other similar cases, to interview Clark. Post-Trial 
MQtipng, Transcript Qf Proceedings, ("flrq, 2"), at 260. Counsel 
for Clark began to state that it was his inclination that the 
Parole Department just needed more information relating to 
Defendant's background when he was interrupted by the Trial Court, 
which made the following comments: 
"Just cooperate. The only thing you get points for is 
cooperation, really, with law enforcement. You are giving me 
the Andrew Valdez speech. I heard it at great length, that 
somehow one should not cooperate with law enforcement, and I 
don't buy that. That's really the purpose, is that you give 
them useful information so they solve other crimes and they 
know what's going on. And if there is no inclination to 
cooperate with law enforcement, then it is an attitude 
problem, and the punishment is more severe to adjust 
attitudes. That's the problem." 
Hra. 2 at 260, 261. 
The Court then stated "I've got some inclination, because of 
your age, to sentence you concurrently. But I am not going to 
sentence you concurrently given your disposition to not give them 
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any information. I think the information WQUlfl be ftelpful to l&W 
enforgement frft^ important enough that I CPUlfl consider the less 
severe sentence. It is not really the Presentence Report 
deficiencies." JLsi* (Emphasis added). The Assistant District 
Attorney was told to send law enforcement officers out to the 
prison to see Clark, and to report back to the Court whether Clark 
cooperated or not. If it was reported that Clark did not 
cooperate, the Trial Court indicated that he would impose 
consecutive sentences, i&. at 263. Thereafter, a third 
sentencing hearing was set for March 22, 1993. 
At the third sentencing hearing, the Trial Court again stated 
that Clark had given the Parole Department little information to 
prepare a report; and it was inclined to run the sentences 
consecutively unless Clark cooperated with law enforcement and 
gave them a full disclosure concerning other crimes in which Clark 
may have been involved, and identified co-conspirators. (Emphasis 
added.) Post-Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings, ("Erg, 3"), 
at 265. Counsel for Clark pointed out that at the conclusion of 
the trial, the Court had suggested that it would accept the 
recommendation in the Presentence Report prepared for Judge 
Hanson's case, and would likely impose a sentence to run 
concurrently with the sentence imposed by Judge Hanson; and that 
it was the State's suggestion that the sentences run 
consecutively. Hra. 3 at 2 66. 
Counsel also pointed out that at the second hearing, there 
had been a turn of events, in which the Trial Court wanted Clark 
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to cooperate with government agents and law enforcement officials 
rather than interview with the Parole Department. X£. at 267, In 
addition to the fact that the Presentence Report before Judge 
Hanson recommended concurrent sentences and expressed no concerns 
about Clark's "lack of cooperation and information", an interview 
with the Parole Department is typically all that is required for 
the imposition of a less severe sentence. 
Counsel for Clark stated to the Court that there was "a very 
real reason for Clark's position in even the sentencing phase of 
this case" - that reason being Clark still had a right to remain 
silent in this phase of his proceedings, and that to do otherwise 
would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and expose Clark to federal prosecution in unsolved 
cases. ifl. In fact, the State of Utah had not even offered Clark 
immunity from further prosecution in exchange for this 
cooperation. As Clark's Counsel pointed out, to compel such 
disclosures under these circumstances would be improper. X£- at 
269. 
Counsel acknowledged that the Trial Court had an interest in 
certain background information, but forcing Clark to become 
involved in this investigation, through possibly self-
incriminating statements, was a violation of his constitutional 
rights. JE^l. at 272. The Court stated that it recognized Clark 
had a right to remain silent, and that he not incriminate himself 
without a grant of immunity from law enforcement agencies. The 
Court also acknowledged that it was not in a position to force 
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Clark to do anything. However, the Court then stated, "it is 
clear that he didn't give any useful information to AP & P. When 
he appeared before me, the prosecutor made the request that he 
cooperate with the law enforcement officers. That's the point in 
which the Court made it clear that that seemed to be appropriate." 
Id. at 273. 
Thereafter, the Trial Court still imposed a consecutive 
sentence because, the Court stated, "there is no indication in 
Judge Hanson's report, as well as mine, that there was any 
cooperation with law enforcement officers to explain these as well 
as other crimes." Id. at 277. (Emphasis added). The Trial 
Court stated that given the lack of cooperation, the Court was 
justified in sentencing Clark to 1 to 15 year sentences on both 
counts. The Trial Court ran the sentences consecutive to each 
other, plus consecutive to the sentence imposed by Judge Hanson in 
another case. I&. at 278. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court violated Clark's constitutional rights when 
it imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent sentences, based 
upon the fact that Clark would not divulge information to law 
enforcement relating to the crimes with which he was charged, or 
other similar crimes that occurred in Utah. Due process applies 
in post-trial, as well as, trial proceedings. Clark raised his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination during the 
sentencing phase of his trial once it was revealed that the Trial 
Court no longer wanted Clark to provide background information to 
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Adult Parole and Probation, but instead, desired Clark to 
cooperate with investigating authorities on the request of the 
State. 
Clark's refusal to cooperate was not an attempt to protect 
any "former partners" in crime, thereby "preserving his ability to 
resume criminal activities upon release", but was to protect his 
right against self incrimination as it related to any future 
federal charges against him. The Trial Court did not have a right 
to consider Clark's refusal to cooperate as one factor in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. The 
sentence imposed by the Trial Court violated Clark's Fifth 
Amendment rights, thereby making it an unconstitutional and 
illegal sentence. Therefore, the Trial Court should have granted 
Clark's Motion to Correct Sentence, which was timely filed, 
because the court "may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(e). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SENTENCED CLARK 
TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BASED UPON CLARK'S REFUSAL TO 
COOPERATE WITH THE INVESTIGATING LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES. 
A. Clark's Refusal to Provide Information to Investigating 
Authorities is Protected bv the Constitution of the 
United States and the State of Utah. 
In Utah, upon conviction of a crime by verdict or plea, the 
sentence imposed rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, within the limits prescribed by law. State v. Peterson, 
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681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984). Due process applies to 
sentencing procedures, and while a trial judge has discretion, 
that discretion is not unlimited, and it may not be exercised on 
the basis of unreliable information. "The defendant has a 
legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads 
to the imposition of sentence even if he may have no right to 
object to a particular result of the sentencing process." State 
v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1985). 
The Fifth Amendment states that "no person shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. 
Const. Amend. V. Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution also 
states "the accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself." "A defendant does not lose this protection by 
reason of his conviction of a crime," and "the availability of the 
privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its 
protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or 
admission and the exposure it invites." United States v. Rogers. 
921 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1990). 
Although the trial court "shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to 
impose consecutive [or concurrent] sentences", Utah Code Ann. §76-
3-401 (2) (1990), this statute does not permit the court to threaten 
a defendant with a harsher sentence merely because that defendant 
asserts his constitutional right to not incriminate himself, 
rather than cooperate with government agents and law enforcement 
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officials. "It is one thing to extend leniency to a defendant who 
is willing to cooperate with the government; it is quite another 
to administer additional punishment to a defendant who by his 
silence has committed no additional offense." Rogers, 921 F.2d at 
983. 
The Fifth Amendment offers protection in the sentencing 
process. The Supreme Court has held that the privilege can be 
claimed in any proceeding, and it protects any disclosures which a 
witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal 
prosecution, or which could lead to other evidence that might so 
be used. United States v. Jones. 640 F.2d 284, 287 (10th Cir. 
1981). A criminal defendant cannot be punished merely because he 
chooses to exercise his constitutional rights against self 
incrimination; and it was, therefore, improper for the Trial Court 
in the present case to punish Clark with a harsher sentence merely 
because he asserted constitutionally protected rights. United 
States v. Seminole, 882 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1985)• 
B. Case Law Supports Clark's Position that His 
Constitutional Rights were Violated When the Trial Court 
Imposed Consecutive Sentences. 
In a case before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
defendant was given a harsher sentence because he refused to 
cooperate with the prosecution by identifying the sources of 
money, and the persons involved in the alleged narcotics 
trafficking conspiracy. United States v. Safirstein. 827 F.2d 
1380, 1387, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit Court held 
"that a sentencing judge may not penalize a defendant for 
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exercising his privilege against self-incrimination by enhancing 
his sentence based upon the defendant's failure to cooperate by 
implicating other persons or otherwise admitting guilt to crimes 
with which he is not charged." Id. 
In a case before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, two 
defendants pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute. In making its judgment on the guilty pleas, the trial 
court stated that it could not extend leniency because neither 
defendant had assisted in law enforcement investigations of 
illicit narcotic traffic. United States v. Garcia. 544 F.2d 681, 
682 (3rd Cir. 1976) . The Appellate Court recognized that two 
conflicting principles of law were in operation simultaneously. 
The first was the Fifth Amendment privilege; and the second 
principle was that of the court to invoke its power to grant 
lenity to defendants who assist the sovereign in improving social 
order and the public welfare. Id. 
The defendants in Garcia argued that the trial court placed 
them in an unfair position. To obtain lenity and avoid 
substantial incarceration, the defendants were required "to be of 
assistance to law enforcement authorities in cleaning up the drug 
problem." i&. at 684. The Third Circuit Court stated that in 
order to obtain lenity on their sentence for a guilty plea in 
which they had admitted guilt to a narrow compass of facts, the 
defendants were improperly coerced to furnish the prosecutor with 
information of a broader and potentially unlimited factual scope. 
The defendants would have been required to supply this information 
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without any assurance of immunity from future federal or state 
prosecutions resulting from the information they might supply. 
l£. at 685. 
If either defendant acceded to the sentencing court's request 
to reveal his source of supply of cocaine, there was no guarantee 
that he would not be subsequently indicted for other criminal 
acts. Id. (emphasis added). Like the Ninth Circuit, the Third 
Circuit Court concluded that the defendants were put to an unfair 
choice. They could either remain silent, and lose the opportunity 
to have leniency, or they could speak, and run the risk of 
subsequent prosecution. The cost of speaking was that the 
defendants had to waive the protection afforded them by the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution. The Court held, therefore, that 
this was too high a price to pay, and the sentences imposed could 
not stand. l£. 
This same choice was thrust upon the defendant in Safirstein. 
and the Ninth Circuit ruled that this was a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. Safirstein. 827 F.2d at 1388. The Second and Fifth 
Circuits have also held in similar situations that imposition of a 
harsher sentence upon a defendant who refused to cooperate with 
law enforcement officials could not stand. See. DiGiovanni v. 
United States. 596 F.2d 74,75 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Ramos. 572 F.2d 360, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Rogers. 504 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1974). 
£L Clark's Fifth Amendment Right was not Raised for the 
First Time on Appeal: but Rather, was Raised During 
Post-Trial Proceedings. 
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The United States Supreme Court has held that unless a 
defendant's silence (refusal to cooperate) is protected by the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a criminal 
defendant at sentencing, as with any other citizen, is ordinarily 
obliged to assist the authorities. Roberts v. United States, 100 
S.Ct. 1358, 1363 (1980). In Roberts, the defendant claimed that 
the District Court had punished him for exercising his Fifth 
Amendment rights. The Supreme Court noted, however, that this 
argument would have merited serious consideration if it had been 
properly presented to the sentencing iudae: but the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right was only raised for the first time on 
appeal. I&. (Emphasis added). 
A criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. j£. at 1364. 
The privilege must be brought to the attention of the tribunal 
which must pass upon it. Thus, as the Supreme Court explained, if 
the defendant believes that his failure to cooperate is 
privileged, he must say so at the time of the sentencing, so that 
the trial court can determine whether his claim is legitimate. 
Id. at 13 64. In Roberts, however, the defendant failed to even 
raise the possibility of self-incrimination over a course of three 
years; and the Supreme Court would not provide retroactive 
protection on appeal. JcL The defendant in Roberts, therefore, 
had no Fifth Amendment privilege. 
The Ninth Circuit has explained that the situation in Roberts 
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is distinct from the facts of the case at bar. In Safirstein. the 
Ninth Circuit noted that Roberts had provided no valid reason for 
his refusal to cooperate; and Roberts merely suggested that he 
really "wasn't that involved in it." Roberts failed to invoke his 
privilege against self-incrimination in defense of his refusal to 
cooperate prior to sentencing. There was no way to determine 
whether Roberts' refusal to cooperate was legitimately motivated, 
and the Court refused to grant retroactive protection. 
Safirstein, 827 F.2d at 1389. Like Clark in the present case, it 
is evident from the outset that Safirstein sought to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege and it was therefore protected. Id. 
The Tenth Circuit has cited Roberts with approval in United 
States v. Ruminer. 786 F.2d 381, 385 (10th Cir. 1986). Ruminer 
involved two defendants who not only refused to cooperate with 
officials pursuant to their plea agreement, but they actually 
suggested false leads in a purposeful attempt to hinder the 
investigation. The Ruminer Court concluded, therefore, that it 
was not faced with the problem of an ambiguous silence as in 
Roberts, but instead, there was affirmative misconduct by the 
defendants which was relevant to the sentencing judge in his duty 
to fix an appropriate sentence, j£l. at 385. Therefore, the Court 
held that the defendants' lack of cooperation and misconduct could 
be taken into account by the trial court in assessing the 
appropriate sentence. Id. (Emphasis added). 
Clark's situation in the present case, being similar to that 
in Safirstein, is distinguishable from both Roberts and Ruminer. 
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and is precisely the type of case contemplated for constitutional 
protection. Because Clark affirmatively asserted his Fifth 
Amendment right to not incriminate himself during post-trial 
proceedings, the issue was timely, and appropriately raised before 
the Trial Court. Clark's present appeal of the Trial Court's 
violation of his Fifth Amendment right is also timely. U.R.Cr.P. 
22(e). 
When it became clear that the Trial Court was no longer 
asking for traditional family and background information, but 
rather affirmative cooperation with government agents and 
information related to other crimes, Counsel for Clark stated at 
the Third Sentencing Hearing that to force Clark to cooperate with 
law enforcement authorities, and subject him to future criminal 
prosecution without any assurance of immunity was a violation of 
Clark's state and federal constitutional rights. Hra. 3 at 267. 
It is important to note that one factor the Ninth Circuit 
considered in determining that Safirstein's rights had been 
violated was the fact that there was no indication in the record 
that the government offered Safirstein immunity. Safirstein. 827 
F.2d at 13 88. There is absolutely no question that Clark was 
never offered any such immunity from the prosecution in the 
present case. 
It is the duty of the sentencing court to determine the 
legitimacy of Clark's reliance on the Fifth Amendment. Rogers v. 
United States, 71 S.Ct. 438, 442, 443 (1951). In fact, the Trial 
Court even recognized that Clark had a legitimate claim. The 
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Trial Court stated: 
"At the outset, the Court clearly recognizes [Clark] has a 
right to remain silent. The Court is in no position to force 
you to do anything. The Presentence Report of November 
23, 1992, given to Judge Hanson, it is clear from that that 
he didn't give much information or wasn't cooperative with 
law enforcement. It is clear that he didn't give any useful 
information to AP & P. When he appeared before me, the 
Prosecutor made the request that he cooperate with the law 
enforcement officers. That's the point in which the Court 
made clear that seemed appropriate. And I would expect that 
he not do that, and he preserve his right to remain 
silent and not incriminate himself absent an authorization of 
immunity from the law enforcement agencies that talk to him. 
So, the Court doesn't mean to deprive him of that." 
Hra. 3 at 273. Despite the Trial Court's observation, it still 
sentenced Clark to the harsher sentence due to his refusal to 
cooperate; and eventually sentenced Clark to consecutive sentences 
"given that lack of cooperation." ££. at 277. 
It is clear that Clark was given the same unfair choice as 
other defendants in similar cases. Clark could either cooperate 
with law enforcement, and expose himself to subsequent state 
and/or federal prosecutions, or refuse to cooperate and receive 
consecutive sentences. Clark was told that his choice would 
result in a concurrent sentence if he cooperated and waived his 
Fifth Amendment rights. Otherwise, he would receive the harshest 
sentence possible if he invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. To 
force Clark to cooperate in an investigation without any grant of 
immunity from the State is clearly a violation of his 
constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it sentenced Clark 
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to a second, and then a third consecutive sentence because Clark 
was not willing to cooperate with law enforcement, despite the 
fact that absolutely no grant of immunity was ever offered. 
Therefore, this Court should find that the Trial Court did, in 
fact, abuse its discretion, and correct the illegal and 
unconstitutional sentence imposed by the Trial Court in this case. 
The absolute most that the Trial Court could justify under the 
circumstances was a single consecutive term for the crimes Clark 
had been convicted of. 
No addendum is necessary for Appellant's Brief. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument in this case as it may 
assist this Court in the disposition of the case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ML day of March, 1995. 
Robert L. Booker 
Attorney for Appellant 
Louis M. Clark 
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